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Abstract
I present direct evidence on the role of rm-to-rm labor mobility in enhanc-
ing the productivity of rms located near highly productive rms. Using
matched employer-employee and balance sheet data for the Veneto region
of Italy, I identify a set of high-wage rms (HWF) and show they are more
productive than other rms. I then show that hiring a worker with HWF ex-
perience increases the productivity of other (non-HWF) rms. A simulation
indicates that worker ows explain 10-15 percent of the productivity gains
experienced by other rms when HWFs in the same industry are added to a
local labor market.
JEL: J24; J31; J61; R23
Keywords: productivity, agglomeration advantages, linked employer-employee
data, labor mobility.
1 Introduction
A prominent feature of the economic landscape in the most developed coun-
tries is the tendency for rms to locate near other rms producing similar
products or services. In the United States, for example, biopharmaceutical
rms are clustered in New York and Chicago and a sizeable share of the ele-
vator and escalator industry is concentrated in the area around Bloomington,
Indiana. In addition, the growth and di¤usion of multinational corporations
has led to the recent appearance of important industrial clusters in several
emerging economies. Firms that originally agglomerated in Silicon Valley
and Detroit now have subsidiaries clustered in Bangalore and Slovakia (Al-
faro and Chen, 2010).
Researchers have long speculated that rms in industrial concentrations
may benet from agglomeration economies, and a growing body of work
has been devoted to studying the importance of these economies. Despite
the di¢ culties involved in estimating agglomeration e¤ects, a consensus has
emerged from the literature that signicant productivity advantages of ag-
glomeration exist for many industries (Rosenthal and Strange, 2003; Hen-
derson, 2003; Ellison, Glaeser and Kerr, 2010; Greenstone, Hornbeck and
Moretti, 2010; Combes et al., 2012). Localized knowledge spillovers are
a common explanation for the productivity advantages of agglomeration.
Nevertheless, as pointed out by Combes and Duranton (2006), if information
can easily ow out of rms, the question of why the e¤ects of spillovers are
localized must be claried.
This paper directly examines the role of labor mobility as a mechanism
for the transfer of e¢ ciency-enhancing knowledge and evaluates the extent to
which labor mobility can explain the productivity advantages of rms located
near other highly productive rms. The underlying idea is that knowledge
is embedded in workers and di¤uses when workers move between rms. The
strong localized aspect of knowledge spillovers discussed in the agglomeration
literature may thus arise from the propensity of workers to change jobs within
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the same local labor market.
In order to empirically assess the importance of labor-market based knowl-
edge spillovers, I use a unique dataset from the Veneto region of Italy that
combines Social Security earnings records and detailed nancial information
for rms. I begin by presenting a simple conceptual framework where some
rms are more productive because they have some superior knowledge. Em-
ployees at these rms passively acquire some proportion of the rms inter-
nal knowledge. For simplicity, I refer to these as "knowledgeable" workers.
Other rms can gain access to the superior knowledge by hiring these work-
ers. Empirically, I identify potential high-productivity rms as those that
pay a relatively high rm-specic wage premium.1 I show that these high-
wage-rms (HWFs) have higher labor productivity, higher value added, and
higher capital (in particular intangible capital) per worker, suggesting the
presence of a rm-specic productivity advantage and thus a point of ori-
gin for the transfer of knowledge. Next, I evaluate the extent to which non
HWFs benet from hiring knowledgeable workers by studying the e¤ect on
productivity associated with hiring workers with recent experience at HWFs.
Productivity shocks that are correlated with the propensity to hire knowl-
edgeable workers may give rise to an upward bias in the impact of knowl-
edgeable workers. In order to address this potential endogeneity issue, I use
control function methods from the recent productivity literature (Olley and
Pakes, 1996; Levinsohn and Petrin, 2003). Another potential threat to iden-
tication is the fact that I do not observe labor quality. In particular, since
the good rms pay a relatively high rm-specic wage premium, workers who
separate from a good rm may be of lower quality. I refer to this potential ad-
verse selection problem as "lemons bias" (Gibbons and Katz, 1991). Lemons
bias will tend to work against the nding of a positive e¤ect of knowledgeable
workers. In order to address this issue, I obtain a proxy for worker ability
1This is consistent with many recent models of frictional labor markets (e.g., Chris-
tensen et al., 2005), in which higher-productivity rms pay higher wages for equivalent
workers.
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and I weight the number of workers in my OLS regression using the average
ability to obtain e¤ective labor input.
I conclude that hiring a worker with HWF experience signicantly in-
creases the productivity of other (non HWF) rms. A non HWF hiring at the
mean gains 0.14-0.28 percent in productivity compared to an observationally
identical rm that hired no knowledgeable workers. This gain is equivalent to
moving 0.2-0.5 centiles up the productivity distribution for the median rm.
The productivity e¤ect of knowledgeable workers is not associated with re-
cently hired workers in general; I do not nd a similar productivity e¤ect for
recently hired workers without experience at good rms.
The number of knowledgeable workers may also be correlated with pro-
ductivity shocks happening in the future if workers can foresee them and ap-
ply for jobs in rms with better growth prospects. To deal with this threat to
identication, I adapt the control function methods to proxy for future pro-
ductivity shocks. As an alternative approach, I instrument for the number of
knowledgeable workers in a non HWF with the number of local good rms in
the same industry that downsized in the previous period. Indeed, following
a downsizing event at a HWF, it is more likely that a knowledgeable worker
applies for job at local non HWFs because s/he is unemployed and does not
want to relocate far away, and not because some particular non HWF o¤ers
better prospects than the HWF at which the worker is employed. This in-
strumental variable (IV) strategy also further guards against the possibility
of lemons bias: the larger the number of workers laid o¤ from HWFs, the
lower, arguably, the extent of selection. The IV estimates return an econom-
ically and statistically signicant e¤ect of recruiting knowledgeable workers
on non HWF productivity, with the point estimate larger than the OLS.
While in principle this is consistent with the idea that the OLS coe¢ cient is
biased downward (lemons bias), in practice the IV standard errors are large
and prevent me from drawing denitive conclusions.
In the last part of the paper, I assess the extent to which worker ows
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can explain the productivity advantages of rms located near other highly
productive rms. I relate my ndings to the existing evidence on the pro-
ductivity advantages of agglomeration, focusing in particular on the study
performed in Greenstone, Hornbeck and Moretti (2010, henceforth GHM).
The authors nd that after the opening of a large manufacturing establish-
ment, total factor productivity (TFP) of incumbent plants in US counties
that were able to attract one of these large plants increases signicantly rela-
tive to the TFP of incumbent plants in counties that survived a long selection
process but narrowly lost the competition. The observed e¤ect on TFP is
larger if incumbent plants are in the same industry as the large plant, and
increases over time. These two facts are consistent with the presence of in-
tellectual externalities that are embodied in workers who move from rm to
rm. However, data limitations prevent GHM from drawing denitive con-
clusions regarding the driving mechanism. I evaluate the extent to which
worker ows explain empirical evidence on the productivity advantages of
agglomeration, by simulating an event similar to that studied by GHM but
within the worker mobility framework described above. The change in pro-
ductivity predicted within this framework equals 10-15 percent of the overall
e¤ect found in GHM, indicating that knowledge transfer through worker
ows explain a signicant portion of the productivity advantages through
agglomeration.
2 Relation to Previous Research
This paper adds to the growing literature on productivity advantages through
agglomeration, a literature critically surveyed in Duranton and Puga (2004),
Rosenthal and Strange (2004) and Moretti (2011). The research relating
most closely to this paper is the body of work on micro-foundations for ag-
glomeration advantages based on knowledge spillovers. In Combes and Du-
ranton (2006)s theoretical analysis, rms clustering in the same locality face
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a trade-o¤ between the advantages of labor pooling (i.e. access to knowledge
carriers) and the costs of labor poaching (i.e. loss of some key employees to
competitors along with higher wage bills to retain other key employees). In
a case study of the British Motor Valley, Henry and Pinch (2000) conclude
that
as personnel move, they bring with them knowledge and ideas
about how things are done in other rms helping to raise the
knowledge throughout the industry...The crucial point is that
whilst this process may not change the pecking order within the
industry, this churningof personnel raises the knowledge base of
the industry as a whole within the region. The knowledge com-
munity is continually reinvigorated and, synonymous with this,
so is production within Motor Sport Valley
In a similar vein, Saxenian (1994) maintains that the geographic proxim-
ity of high-tech rms in Silicon Valley is associated with a more e¢ cient ow
of new ideas. I contribute to the literature on micro-foundations for agglom-
eration advantages by showing direct evidence of productivity gains through
worker ows. My results are consistent with the ndings by Henry and Pinch
(2000). Since worker ows in a local labor market are larger within an indus-
try, and, as I shall show, the productivity e¤ect is larger for workers moving
within the same industry, my results may also help explain the ndings in
Henderson (2003), Cingano and Schivardi (2004) and Moretti (2004a) that
local spillovers are increasing in economic proximity.2
Some research beyond the agglomeration literature has also emphasized
the fact that new workers share ideas on how to organize production or infor-
mation on new technologies that they learned with their previous employer.
Balsvik (2011) uses matched employer-employee data from Norway and o¤ers
2Measures of economic links include input and output ows and indicators of techno-
logical linkages.
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a detailed account of productivity gains linked to worker ows from foreign
multinational to domestic rms. Similarly, using linked worker-rm data,
Parrotta and Pozzoli (2012) and Stoyanov and Zubanov (2012) show evi-
dence from Denmark that is consistent with models of knowledge di¤usion
through labor mobility. My ndings are consistent with those of these three
recent papers. My empirical strategy, however, allows me to make progress
on the identication of the causal e¤ect of recruiting knowledgeable workers
on productivity. I address the three main identication issues, namely (a) un-
observable contemporaneous productivity shocks at time t, (b) unobservable
worker quality and (c) unobservable future productivity shocks, using several
approaches, including control function methods from the recent productivity
literature and an IV strategy. Furthermore, while the above authors focus
exclusively on the role of labor mobility for knowledge transfer, I seek to shed
light on a broader question: the extent to which labor mobility can explain
evidence on the productivity advantages through agglomeration.
3 Conceptual Framework
Assume there exists a nite number of locations, each constituting a separate
local labor market. To x ideas, assume that these labor markets are com-
pletely segmented with workers being immobile between them. There exists
a nite collection J = fJ0;J1g of rms consisting of the set J1 good rms,
which are more productive because they have some superior knowledge and
set J0 other rms which have no access to the superior knowledge. The su-
perior knowledge is exogenously given and could include information about
export markets, physical capital, process innovations, new managerial tech-
niques, new organizational forms and intermediate inputs. Workers employed
by good rms acquire some proportion of the rmsinternal knowledge. For
simplicity, I assume that this acquisition of internal knowledge takes place
immediately after the workers join the good rm. Workers are knowledge-
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able if they have knowledge of the relevant information and unknowledgeable
otherwise. All workers employed by good rms, then, are knowledgeable.
Additionally, some proportion of this knowledge can be transferred to a j 2
J0 rm if the workers switch employers.3 The production function of rm
j 2 J0 is
Yj = F (Lj; Kj;Mj) = Aj[(jLj)
KjM

j ]
 (1)
where L = H + N; i.e. the sum of knowledgeable workers (H;who moved
at some point from a good rm to a non-good rm) and unknowledgeable
workers (N);  is the quality of the workforce, K is total capital inputs, M
is material inputs, and  < 1 represent an element of diminishing return to
scale, or to "span of control" in the managerial technology (Lucas, 1978).4 I
allow for knowledge transfer by:
Aj = Dje
HHj (2)
4 Econometric Framework
I obtain the regression equation that forms the basis of my empirical analysis,
by combining equation (1) and (2) and taking logs:
ln(Yjslt)= L ln(jsltLjslt) + K ln(Kjslt) + M ln(Mjslt) + HHjslt + 0 + jslt
(3)
The dependent variable is the real value of total rm production, s denotes
industry, l denotes locality and t denotes year.5 The variable of interest, H is
constructed from head counts in the matched employer-employee data. The
term ln(Dj) is decomposed into two elements, 0 and jslt. The constant 0
3I assume that this type of knowledge cannot all be patented and that exclusive labor
contracts are not available.
4This is in line with the large presence, that I document below, of small and medium
size rms in the non-HWF sample.
5Notice that L = ; K = ; M = :
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denotes mean e¢ ciency across all rms in J0 that is due to factors others than
H. The time-variant jslt represents deviations from this mean e¢ ciency level
and captures (a) unobserved factors a¤ecting rm output, (b) measurement
error in inputs and output, and (c) random noise. Estimating the e¤ect of
recruiting a knowledgeable worker on a rms productivity is di¢ cult in the
presence of unobservable contemporaneous productivity shocks, unobserved
labor quality and unobservable future productivity shocks. I turn now to
describing what type of biases these unobservables may introduce and how I
deal with them in the empirical work.
4.1 Productivity shocks at time t
Express jslt , the deviations from mean rm e¢ ciency not resulting from
knowledge transfer, as
jslt = !

jslt + jslt = !jslt + st +$lt + jslt (4)
which species that jslt contains measurement error jslt and a productivity
component !jslt (TFP) known to the rm but unobserved by the econometri-
cian. The productivity component can be further divided into a rm-specic
term, a term common to all rms in a given industry (st) and a term com-
mon to all rms in a given locality ($lt). Equation (3) now becomes:
ln(Yjslt)= 0 + L ln(jsltLjslt)+K ln(Kjslt)+M ln(Mjslt)+HHjslt+st+$lt+!jslt+vjslt
(5)
One major di¢ culty in estimating H in Equation (5) is that non HWFs
may decide on their choice of H based on the realized rm-specic pro-
ductivity shock (!jslt) unknown to the researcher. When employing OLS
to estimate Equation (5) without accounting for the existence of !jslt; the
bias induced by endogeneity between H and !jslt is likely positive (positive
productivity shocks translate into higher probability to hire from HWFs),
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implying that the coe¢ cient estimate will be biased upward (cH > H).
I employ the productivity literatures techniques to control for the endo-
geneity of inputs in order to assess the relevance of this issue in my setting. In
particular, I apply the Olley and Pakes (1996, henceforth OP) and the Levin-
sohn and Petrin (2003, henceforth LP) approaches. OP construct an explicit
model for the rms optimization problem in order to obtain their production
function estimator. Essentially, the authors address the issue of endogeneity
of inputs by inverting the investment function to back out and thus control
for productivity. Building on OP, LP suggest the use of intermediate input
demand in place of investment demand as a proxy for unobserved productiv-
ity. The results are shown in Section 7.1. See Eberhardt and Helmers (2010)
for an in-depth discussion of these structuralestimators.
4.2 Unobserved Worker Quality
Another potential threat to identication is the fact that I do not observe
labor quality. In particular, since the good rms pay a relatively high rm-
specic wage premium, workers who separate from a good rm may be of
lower quality. This lemons bias may work against the nding of a positive
e¤ect of knowledgeable workers. In order to address this issue, I obtain a
proxy for worker ability and I weight the number of workers in my OLS re-
gression using the average ability to obtain e¤ective labor input. Specically,
I weight the total number of workers L by rm js average worker ability level
jslt =
1
Ljslt
LjsltX
i=1
i, to obtain e¤ective labor input. jslt is time-varying at the
rm level, given that the number and composition of workers change. In
order to obtain the individual i, I procure estimates of worker xed e¤ects
from wage equations where both rm and worker e¤ects can be identied.
Section 4.5 describes this estimation in detail.
The IV strategy based on the events of downsizing at good rms (de-
scribed in Section 4.4) further guards against the possibility of lemons bias:
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the larger the number of workers laid o¤ from HWFs, the lower, arguably,
the extent of selection.
4.3 Productivity shocks at time t+1
The number of knowledgeable workers may be correlated with productivity
shocks happening in the future if workers can foresee them and apply for jobs
at rms with better growth prospects. If such rms prefer to hire workers
from good rms, these workers will have a higher probability of being cho-
sen. To the extent that preferring workers from good rms can be explained
through knowledge transfer from these rms, a positive correlation between
H and the receiving rms productivity shocks in t + 1 does suggest a role
for labor mobility as a channel for knowledge transfer, even though it will
overestimate its importance (Stoyanov and Zubanov, 2012).
In an e¤ort to proxy for productivity shocks in t+ 1 that may be antici-
pated by the workers, I add polynomial functions of capital and investment
and of capital and materials in both t and t + 1. This is in the spirit of
the OP and LP approaches and assumes that hiring rms are also able to
anticipate their productivity shocks and adjust their inputs accordingly. As
an alternative approach to deal with this issue, I adopt an IV strategy that
I now describe.
4.4 Using the number of downsizing rms as IV
In Section 7.2 I present estimates where I instrument for the number of
knowledgeable workers in a non HWF with the number of local good rms
in the same 5-digit industry that downsized in the previous period. The
IV strategy is an alternative approach to deal with the strategic mobility
issue discussed in the previous section. Indeed following a downsizing event
at a HWF, it is more likely that a knowledgeable worker applies for job at
local non HWFs because s/he is unemployed and does not want to relocate
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far away, and not because some particular non HWFs o¤er better prospects
than the HWF at which the worker is employed. Put di¤erently, in the
scenario captured by the IV approach, the strategic mobility explanation is
less likely to play a major role.
One can think of two main reasons why good rms may downsize in a
particular year. First, good rms may get a bad draw from the distribution
of product-market conditions. Even though an inherent productivity advan-
tage partly insulates the good rms from output shocks, su¢ ciently large
shocks will pierce this insulation and induce the good rm to layo¤ workers.
Alternatively, good rms may downsize in a particular year due to o¤shoring.
The basic intuition behind the IV approach is to consider moves from
workers whose former employer downsized due to demand shocks or o¤-
shoring. While the timing of these moves is arguably exogenous, these work-
ers may still decide which new employer to join among the set of non-HWFs.
However, in small labor markets and specialized industries, workers may have
a limited set of alternatives (Tecu, 2012).
The choice of the instrument is based on the notion that geographic prox-
imity plays an important role in determining worker mobility. In January
2012, I visited several Veneto rms and interviewed employees about the
history of their enterprises and their current operations. I also conducted
phone interviews with o¢ cials of employers associations and chambers of
commerce. My anecdotal evidence supports the idea that distance acts as
a barrier for job mobility.6 In Appendix III I further discuss the role of
geographic proximity.
In the presence of product demand shocks or o¤shoring, using the number
of downsizing rms as an instrument is invalid if it cannot be excluded from
6In a phone interview, Federico Callegari of the Treviso Chamber of Commerce, rea-
soned out the role of geographic proximity: I think distance matters a lot for workersjob
mobility. When losing their job, workers tend to look for another job with a commuting
time of maximum 20-30 minutes. Why? Because they want to go home during the lunch
break!"
11
the causal model of interest (Equation 3). The identifying assumption of
my IV strategy is therefore that the number of downsizing good rms is
correlated with the causal variable of interest; H; but uncorrelated with any
other unobserved determinants of productivity.
4.5 Identication of Good Firms
Empirically, I identify potential high-productivity rms as high-wage rms
(HWFs), i.e. those that pay a relatively high rm-specic wage premium.
This is consistent with many recent models of frictional labor markets (e.g.,
Christensen et al., 2005), in which higher-productivity rms pay higher wages
for equivalent workers. As I shall show below using balance sheet data, HWFs
have signicant higher output per worker and value added per worker than
other rms in my sample.
There are three reasons why I dene the good rms as HWFs and detect
them using Social Security data rather than dene the good rms directly as
the highly productive ones and detect them using balance sheet data. First,
the availability of worker-level Social Security data allows the introduction of
measured individual characteristics and worker e¤ects, something impossible
to capture with rm level data from balance sheets. Second, Social Security
data are available for a longer period of time than the balance sheets, and
therefore increase the precision of the categorization of rms into good and
non-good groups. Third, since Social Security records are administrative
data, measurement error is lower than in balance sheets.
Following Abowd, Kramarz andMargolis (1999, henceforth AKM), I spec-
ify a loglinear statistical model of wages as follows:
wijt = X
0
it + i +  j + vt + "ijt (6)
where the dependent variable, the log of the average daily wage earned by
worker i in rm j in year t, is expressed as a function of individual hetero-
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geneity, rm heterogeneity, and measured time-varying characteristics.7 The
assumptions for the statistical residual "ijt are (a) E["ijtji; j; t; x] = 0, (b)
V ar["ijtji; j; t; x] <1 and (c) orthogonality to all other e¤ects in the model.
The presence of labor mobility in matched worker-rm data sets enables
the identication of worker and rm e¤ects.8 I identify good rms as those
whose estimated rm xed e¤ects fall within the top third of all estimated
rm e¤ects. Section 6 reports more details on the estimation procedure.
5 Data
The data set is for Veneto, an administrative region in the Northeast of Italy
with a population of around 5 million people (8 percent of the countrys to-
tal). Since the mid-1980s, the labor market in Veneto has been characterized
by nearly full employment, a positive rate of job creation in manufacturing
and positive migration ows (Tattara and Valentini, 2010). The dynamic
regional economy features a large presence of exible rms, frequently or-
ganized in districts with a level of industrial value added greatly exceeding
the national average.9 Manufacturing rms in Veneto specialize in metal-
engineering, goldsmithing, plastics, furniture, garments, textiles, leather and
shoes.10 The manufacture of food and beverage, and wine and baked goods
in particular, is also a prominent subsector.
My data set pools three sources of information: individual earnings records,
7The vector X 0it includes tenure, tenure squared, age, age squared, a dummy variable
for manager and white collar status, and interaction terms between gender and other
individual characteristics.
8The identication relies on the assumption that mobility is exogenous to the included
regressors. Bias in the estimated rm e¤ects arises when errors predict specic rm-to-
rm transitions. Card, Heining and Kline (2012) conduct a series of checks for patterns
of endogenous mobility that could lead to systematic bias in AKMs additive worker and
rm e¤ects model. The authors nd little evidence of such biases in German data.
9The most famous industrial concentration is the eyewear district in the province of
Belluno, where Luxottica, the worlds largest manufacturer of eyeglasses, has production
plants.
10Benetton, Sisley, Geox, Diesel, and Replay are Venetian brands.
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rm balance sheets, and information on local labor markets (LLMs).11 The
earnings records come from the Veneto Workers History (VWH) dataset.
The VWH has data on all private sector personnel in the Veneto region over
the period 1975-2001. Specically, it contains register-based information for
virtually any job lasting at least one day. A complete employment history
has been reconstructed for each worker.
Balance sheets starting from 1995 were obtained from AIDA (Analisi
Informatizzata delle Aziende), a database circulated by Bureau Van Dijk
containing o¢ cial records of all incorporated nonnancial Italian rms with
annual revenues of at least 500,000 Euros. AIDAs balance sheets include
rmslocation, revenues, total wage bill, the book value of capital (broken
into subgroups), value added, number of employees, value of materials and
industry code. I use rm identiers to match job-year observations for work-
ers aged 16-64 in the VWH with rm nancial data in AIDA for the period
1995-2001. Further details on the match and data restrictions I make are
provided in Appendix I.
Information on LLMs is obtained from the National Institute of Statistics
(ISTAT). The LLMs are territorial groupings of municipalities characterized
by a certain degree of working-day commuting by the resident population. In
1991 the 518 municipalities or comuni in Veneto are divided into 51 LLMs.
6 AKM Estimation and Characterization of
Good Firms
The method in Abowd, Creecy and Kramarz (2002) identies separate groups
of workers and rms that are connected via labor mobility in matched employer-
employee data. When a group of workers and rms is connected, the group
contains all persons who ever worked for any rm within the group and all
11The rst two sources, combined for the period 1995-2001, have been used in the study
on rent-sharing, hold-up and wages by Card, Devicienti and Maida (2010).
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rms at which any of the persons were ever employed. I run the grouping al-
gorithm separately using VWH data from 1987 to 2000 for rms that could be
matched in AIDA. I then use the created group variable to choose the largest
group as a sample for my xed-e¤ects estimation - Equation (6). Details
on sample restrictions and descriptive statistics are provided in Appendix I.
Figure 1 shows the distribution of estimated rm e¤ects.
I identify HWFs as those rms whose rm e¤ects rank in the top third
of the sample. Figure 2 shows the geographical variation in the number of
HWFs across LLMs for the most recent year (2001).
For labor mobility to generate productivity benets of agglomeration, a
rm-specic advantage should be observed at good rms that could be the
basis for knowledge transfer to other rms in the region. Therefore, once I
have categorized rms into HWF and non HWF groups, I estimate:
lnOjst= 0 + 1HWFjs + s + vt + ejst (7)
where the dummy HWF takes the value of 1 if rm j is classied as high-
wage and Ojst represents di¤erent rm-level outcomes. Table 1 shows the
results of estimating Equation (7).
[TABLE 1 HERE]
In the Veneto manufacturing sector clear di¤erences between HWFs and
non HWFs emerge in labor productivity (measured as output per worker,
Column 1), value added per worker (Column 2) and capital per worker (Col-
umn 3), including both tangible capital (Column 4) and, most remarkably,
intangible xed assets (Column 5). This evidence is important for estab-
lishing the potential for knowledge transfer in the region. Since labor pro-
ductivity is on average 15 percent higher in HWFs, and intangible capital
per worker (intellectual property, accumulated research and development in-
vestments and goodwill) is 27 percent larger, we can also think of HWFs as
high-productivity rms, or high-intangible-capital rms.
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For labor mobility to be a mechanism for transfer of knowledge, we must
also observe some workers moving from HWFs to other rms. Appendix
II discusses the extent of labor mobility from HWF to non HWF. It also
presents descriptive statistics on individual characteristics of the movers in
my sample.
7 Evidence on Worker Flows and Productiv-
ity
7.1 Main Estimates
In this section I present the main result from regression analysis in this
paper. Specically, I evaluate the extent to which non HWFs benet from
hiring workers from HWFs. Estimation of Equation (3) is performed over
the period for which balance sheet data are available (1995-2001). Details
on sample restrictions and descriptive statistics for the variables used in the
regression analysis are provided in Appendix I. Table 2 shows the estimation
results. I cluster standard errors at the rm level. Coe¢ cients associated with
the H measure in Table 2 represent semielasticities because my variable of
interest is not in logarithms. This choice for the baseline specication, which
directly follows from Equation (2), is founded on the fact that H takes on the
value 0 for the majority of observations. Thus, any possible transformation
of the H measure could possibly a¤ect the associated estimated parameters.
In any case, Appendix IV I show results using di¤erent functional forms.
[TABLE 2 HERE]
Column 1 reports estimate from the baseline OLS specication: the coef-
cient on Hjst is positive (0.039) and signicant.12 Column 2 and 3 of Table
12All inputs are positive and statistically signicant, and the labor coe¢ cient is an
expected 71% of the summed coe¢ cients for labor and capital. The overall production
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2 employ the productivity literatures techniques to control for the endogene-
ity of inputs. Hjst is treated as a freely variable input. Column 2 reports
results using the OP estimator: the coe¢ cient for Hjst is positive (0.037) and
signicant.13 Column 3 reports the results for LP estimator: the coe¢ cient
for Hjst is positive (0.020) and signicant; it is lower than the OLS estimate,
conrming the theoretical and empirical results on variable inputs discussed
in LP.14
Although the estimate of the coe¢ cients for Hjst in the OP and LP spec-
ication are smaller than the baseline estimate, none of the specications
is qualitatively inconsistent with the empirical nding that labor mobility
works as a channel of knowledge transfer. The point estimates suggest that
the average e¤ect of recruiting a knowledgeable worker on a non HWFs pro-
ductivity is an increase of between 2 and 3.9 percent. This seems like a very
large e¤ect. However, I discuss in Appendix II, the mean number of knowl-
edgeable workers is 0.071 and as many as 95.7 percent of non HWFs in a
given year do not employ any worker of this type. Hiring one worker of this
type therefore implies a large change for most rms in our data (Notice also
that non-HWFs are quite small: the median number of employees at non
HWFs is 33).
function has mild decreasing returns to scale, with a 1 percent increase in all inputs leading
to a 0.9 percent increase in output.
13I use the opreg Stata routine developed by Yasar, Raciborski and Poi (2008). I do
not observe investment, and hence derived a proxy variable in t as the di¤erence between
the reported book value of capital at time t+ 1 and its value in t: The way I constructed
the proxy variable somehow exacerbates the measurement error problems typically asso-
ciated with the proxy variable approach. In addition, augmenting my specication with
this proxy variable reduces my sample size substantially, as (a) 3871 rm-year observa-
tions are lost when I take the di¤erence in reported book values and (b) the OP approach
requires positive values for the proxy variable, eliminating an additional 7174 rm-year
observations. (The estimation routine will truncate rmsnon-positive proxy variable ob-
servations because the monotonicity condition necessary to invert the investment function,
and hence back out productivity, does not hold for these observations.)
14I use the levpet Stata routine developed by Petrin, Poi and Levinsohn (2004).
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As a further illustration of Table 2s estimates, given the mean value of H
(0.07) and its slope coe¢ cient in Column 1, cH =0:039, a non-HWF hiring
at the mean H gains 0:039  0:07 = 0:28 percent in productivity compared to
an observationally identical rm that hired no-one. This gain is equivalent
to moving 0.5 centiles up the productivity distribution for the median rm.
If one uses the LP estimate instead of the OLS, the gain is equal to 0:14
percent (0:2 centiles up in the distribution).
In an e¤ort to proxy for productivity shocks in t+1 that may be antici-
pated by the workers (recall the discussion in Section 4.3), in Column 4 and
5 I add polynomial functions of capital and investments or capital and mate-
rials in t and t+1. These estimates also suggest that non HWFs benet from
knowledgeable workers by experiencing increased productivity.15 In Section
7.2 I show results from the IV strategy, an alternative approach to deal with
the strategic mobility issue that may arise as a result of the presence of
unobservable shocks in t+ 1.
Next, I address the questions of whether the knowledge embedded in
workers is general enough to be applied in di¤erent industries: Column 6 of
Table 2 di¤erentiates between workers with HWF experience moving within
the same two-digit industry and workers moving between industries. The
coe¢ cient of knowledgeable workers moving within industry is highly signif-
icant and positive (0.072). The coe¢ cient of knowledgeable workers moving
between industries is signicant and positive but smaller (0.024). The di¤er-
ence in the two coe¢ cients is signicant at conventional levels.
Overall, the main empirical result in this Section is that labor mobility
from HWFs to other rms in the region works as a mechanism for the transfer
of e¢ ciency-enhancing knowledge. Hiring within the same industry brings
more relevant new knowledge than that which can be acquired from workers
15That said, most of the components in the polynomial approximations are statistically
signicant, implying that these extra terms contribute in explaining the variation in pro-
ductivity among rms. Notice the drop in observations due to the fact that we are using
the leads of inputs (polynomials in t+ 1).
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previously employed outside.
Appendix IV investigates the robustness of these ndings to di¤erent
specications and explores potential alternative explanations of the estimated
productivity e¤ects. In particular, I investigate the role of the selection of
movers based on observable characteristics and unobserved rm heterogene-
ity. I also evaluate the role of functional form assumptions, and I explore
the importance of time-varying unobservables correlated with the number of
recent hires.
7.2 IV Estimates
In this section I instrument for the number of knowledgeable workers using
the lagged number of good local rms in the same 5-digit industry that down-
sized in the previous period. This exercise is motivated by the possibility of
strategic mobility and lemons bias that I discussed above. The exclusion
restriction is violated and cHIV is biased upward if there are localized un-
observable industry shocks that lead good rms to downsize and positively
a¤ect productivity at non HWFs. Below, I further discuss the validity of the
IV strategy.
Turning to the details of the instrument, a downsizing rm must see
an employment reduction larger than 3 percent compared to the previous
years level. The division of good rms into downsizing and non-downsizing
rms according to this criterion is less sensible for small rms. Accordingly, I
impose the additional condition that the decrease in the labor force is greater
than or equal to three individuals.
Table 3 shows the results from the IV estimation of Equation (3). Stan-
dard errors are clustered at the level of the LLM.
[TABLE 3 HERE]
The F test of excluded instruments in Column 1 gives a statistic of 23.116.
16The coe¢ cient of the number of downsizing rm in the rst-stage regression is equal
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The estimated coe¢ cient ofH is large: cHIV = 0.268. However, the standard
error is also large (0.154). The coe¢ cient is signicant at the 10 percent level.
A concern for the validity of the exclusion restriction arises from the
observation that the dependent variable in my econometric model is the value
of output.17 Unobserved shifts in local demand from HWFs to non HWFs
might simultaneously lead to (a) higher output prices for non HWFs, (b)
downsizing by HWFs and (c) hiring of HWF employees by non HWFs. The
LLM-year e¤ects control for local demand shocks, but localized unobservable
industry shocks may still play a role. Consequently, in principle, it is possible
that cHIV > 0 reects higher output prices, rather than higher productivity
due to knowledge transfer. I do not expect this to be a major factor in my
context; manufacturing rms in my sample generally produce goods traded
outside the LLM.18 To further explore this possibility in Column 2 I add a
dummy taking value one if the industry produces goods that are not widely
traded outside the LLM.19 The results in Column 2 are very similar to those
in Column 1.
Even when the level of tradability is controlled for, product demand e¤ects
might still be relevant and cHIV might therefore be biased if an industry is
strongly localized. In such a scenario the negative shock to the local HWF
may lead to increased demand for the non HWF rm j even though the HWF
and the non HWF produce a tradable good. This is because, since most of
the rms producing that particular good in Italy are in the same Veneto
LLM, the non HWF may experience an increase in demand, and hence in
price, after the negative shock to a local HWF that is a direct competitor
to .017 (standard error is 0.003). A one standard deviation increase in the instrumental
variable is associated with an increase in H of 0.02.
17The theoretically correct dependent variable in a productivity study is the quantity of
output, but, due to data limitations, this study (and virtually all the empirical literature
on productivity) uses price multiplied by quantity.
18Imagine the extreme case of a non-HWF that produces a nationally traded good in a
perfectly competitive industry. Its output prices would not increase disproportionately if
the LLM experienced an increased demand for its good.
19See Appendix V for details.
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on the national market. To address this concern, I construct an index of
industry localization as follows rs = (Italian F irms in s)=(V eneto F irms
in s): Industries with low r have a relatively small number of rms outside
the Veneto area. In Column 3 I enter rs as additional regressor: the F test
gives a slightly larger statistic (24.4) and cHIV is estimated slightly more
precisely (standard error is 0.145). The point estimate is very similar.
Finally, in column 4 I use a stricter denition of downsizing rms: a
downsizing rm must see an employment reduction larger than 5 percent
compared to the previous years level.20 The F test gives a slightly lower
statistic (21.6), the standard error is larger (0.164) and cH is no longer
signicant at 10 percent level. However, the point estimate is quite similar
to that in the previous columns (0.231).
Recall the OLS estimates: (a) the coe¢ cient on knowledgeable workers
is 0.039 and (b) the coe¢ cient on knowledgeable workers moving within the
same two-digit industry is 0.072. In principle, the IV estimates (that are
likely to be driven by ows within industries, given the way the instrument
is designed) are consistent with the idea that the OLS coe¢ cient is biased
downward because of negative selection (lemons bias). In practice, however,
the IV standard errors are large and prevent me from drawing denitive
conclusions.
Another tentative explanation for the magnitude of the IV results is that
the e¤ect of knowledgeable workers may be heterogeneous across rms. If
there are indeed heterogeneous e¤ects of H on productivity, then consistent
OLS measures the average e¤ect of H on productivity across all rms, while
Two Stage Least Squares (TSLS) estimates the average e¤ect in the subset
of rms that are marginal in the recruitment decision, in the sense that they
recruit knowledgeable workers if and only if there exists excess local supply.21
20I keep the additional condition that the decrease in the labor force is greater than or
equal to three individuals. Both the baseline instrumental variable and this alternative
one are summarized in Table A.5.
21See Imbens and Angrist (1994) for a discussion. For a recent example, see Eisensee
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If the e¤ect of knowledgeable workers on productivity is larger for non HWFs
that are marginal in the recruitment decision, the TSLS estimates will exceed
those of consistent OLS.
8 Worker ows and agglomeration advantages
In this Section I assess the extent to which worker ows can explain the
productivity advantages of rms located near other highly productive rms.
In order to do so, I simulate an event analogous to that studied by GHM but
within my framework, and I predict the change in local productivity that is
due to labor mobility. The event I simulate is an increase in the number of
good rms such that the change in local output is comparable to the output
of the average large plant whose opening is considered by GHM.22
An overview of my procedure is as follows. Denote the number of knowl-
edgeable workers moving within industry observed at rm j with H ind. As
a rst step, I estimate the e¤ect on H indj of a change in the number of good
local rms within the same industry as j. If a worker is hired from a HWF
in the same industry at time t   g, she contributes to H indj from year t   g
until t.23 This implies that H ind exhibits a certain degree of persistence and
suggests estimation of a dynamic model for the number of workers observed
at rm j who have HWF experience in the same industry.
In the second step, I predict the change inH ind that each of the non HWFs
and Strömberg (2007).
22The large plants in GHM generated bidding from local governments, almost certainly
because there was a belief of important positive e¤ects on the local economy. GHM observe
that the mean increase in TFP after the opening is (a) increasing over time and (b) larger
if incumbent plants have the same industrial classication as the large plant. These two
facts are consistent with the presence of intellectual externalities that are embodied in
workers who move from rm to rm. I think of the plants considered by GHM as good
plants, and in order to simulate their experiment I consider a change in the number of
Veneto good rms such that the change in local output is comparable.
23It may be instructive to consider a practical example. Consider a worker who joins
HWF j in 1995 after separating from a HWF in 1992. If the worker remains in j until
2000, she will contributes to Hindj count for every year from 1995 to 2000.
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in a LLM would experience if an output increase similar to the one considered
by GHMwere to occur, and I multiply the predicted change inH ind by cHind,
the estimated coe¢ cient onH ind in my productivity regression. This product
yields the predicted change in productivity due to worker ows for a given
Veneto rm if its locality and industry were to experience an increase in
output analogous to that considered by GHM.
In the nal step, I compare my estimate of the predicted contribution
of worker ows to productivity changes with GHMs estimate of the overall
productivity e¤ect. This comparison allows me to have a sense of the extent
to which worker ows can explain the productivity gains experienced by other
rms when high-productivity rms in the same industry are added to a local
labor market.
I will now discuss the issues related to the implementation of the rst
step, i.e. the estimation of the dynamic e¤ect on H indj of a change in the
number of good rms in the same locality and industry.
8.1 A dynamic model for the number of knowledgeable
workers
Consider a model of the form
H indjlst = aH
ind
jsl;t 1 + bGood_Firmsls(j)t + ejlst (8)
ejlst = mj + vjlst
E[mj] = E[vjlst] = E[mjvjlst] = 0 (9)
where Good_Firmsls(j)t is the number of local good rms in the same indus-
try of rm j: Recall that the subscript ind represent workers moving within
industry. The disturbance term ejlst has two orthogonal components: the rm
e¤ect, mj and the idiosyncratic shock, vjlst: Using OLS to estimate Equation
(8) is problematic because the correlation between H indjsl;t 1 and the rm e¤ect
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in the error term gives rise to "dynamic panel bias" (Nickell, 1981). Appli-
cation of the Within Groups estimator would draw the rm e¤ects out of the
error term, but dynamic panel bias would remain (Bond, 2002). Therefore I
employ the rst-di¤erence transform, proposed by Arellano and Bond (1991):
H indjlst = aH
ind
jsl;t 1 + bGood_Firmsls(j)t + vjlst (10)
The rm e¤ects have now disappeared, but the lagged dependent variable
is still potentially endogenous as the H indjsl;t 1 in H
ind
jsl;t 1 = H
ind
jsl;t 1 H indjsl;t 2
is correlated with the vjls;t 1 in vjlst = vjls;t   vjls;t 1. However, longer
lags of the regressors remain orthogonal to the error and are available for
use as instruments. Natural candidate instruments for H indjsl;t 1 are H
ind
jsl;t 2
and H indjsl;t 2 : Both H
ind
jsl;t 2 and H
ind
jsl;t 2 are mathematically related to
H indjsl;t 1 = H
ind
jsl;t H indjsl;t 1 but not to the error term vjlst = vjls;t  vjls;t 1,
provided that the vjlst are not serially correlated.24
In principle, another challenge in estimating (10) is that rms in a given
industry do not select their location randomly. Firms maximize prots and
decide to locate where their expectation of the present discounted value of
future prots is greatest. This net present value di¤ers across locations de-
pending on many factors, including transportation infrastructure, subsidies,
etc. These factors, whose value may be di¤erent for rms in di¤erent indus-
tries, are unobserved, and they may be correlated with H indjlst. It should be
noted, however, that a positive shock in LLM j and industry s such that
there is entry of HWFs (i.e. an increase in Good_Firmsls(j)t) makes it less
likely that a non HWFs is going to hire from a good rm in the same indus-
try. This is because the shock is good news for good rms, so in principle
it should make it less likely for the labor force at the good rms to experi-
ence a decrease, and in turn, it should make it less likely for a non HWF to
24Arellano and Bond (1991) develop a test for autocorrelation in the idiosyncratic dis-
turbance term vjlst. It checks for serial correlation of order l in levels by looking for
correlation of order l + 1 in di¤erences. I employ this test below.
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hire from a good rm. The bias introduced by the fact that good rms do
not choose their location randomly is therefore likely to be downwards, and
thus working against the nding of a positive e¤ect of Good_firmsls(j)t
on H ind: In any case, Good_Firmsls(j)t is treated as endogenous in the
estimation.
Table 4 gives the results of estimating Equation (10) for the period 1989-
2001.25
[TABLE 4 HERE]
Column 1 uses the classic Arellano-Bond Di¤erence GMM estimator and
shows a positive (0.004) and signicant coe¢ cient of the number of good
local rms. This is in line with the idea discussed above of an important
role of geographic and economic proximity in determining worker mobility.
Column 1 also shows a positive (0.231) and signicant coe¢ cient for the
lagged dependent variable. The p-value of the Hansen test for overidentifying
restrictions does not suggest misspecication. The Arellano-Bond test for
serial correlation fails to indicate that the vjlst are serially correlated.
Columns 2 to 4 investigate the robustness of these estimates to di¤erent
specications. I begin by using a di¤erent transform, proposed by Arel-
lano and Bover (1995), namely the "forward orthogonal deviations" trans-
form.26 I then estimate the model with two-step GMM and Windmeijer
(2005)-corrected cluster-robust errors.27 Finally I estimate the model with
25I include time dummies in order to remove universal time-related shocks from the
errors. Since these specications do not require information collected from AIDA balance
sheets, the sample period is not restricted to post-1995 observations.
26Rather than subtracting the observation in t 1 from the observation in t, the orthog-
onal deviations transform subtracts the average of all future available observations of a
variable. This has the advantage of reducing data loss because, no matter how many gaps,
it is computable for each rm. Since I remove all rm-year observations with remarkably
high or low values for the number of employees, my estimation panel indeed has some
gaps, which are magnied by the rst-di¤erence transform. (If some Hjlst is missing, for
example, then both Hjlst and Hjlst+1 are missing in the rst-di¤erenced data.)
27See Roodman (2009) for a detailed discussion of two-step GMM and Windmeijer-
correction.
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two-step GMM, Windmeijer-corrected standard errors and orthogonal devi-
ations. The estimates in Columns 2 to 4 are similar to those in Column
1.
8.2 Simulation Results
Having estimated the dynamic e¤ect onH indj of a change inGood_Firmsls(j)t;
I can predict the changes in H, and hence in productivity, that a given non-
HWF in Veneto would experience after an output increase similar to the one
considered by GHM. As it turns out, the large manufacturing plants whose
openings are studied by GHM are much larger than the typical good rm
in Veneto.28 In order to observe a change in local output comparable to the
typical output increase caused by the opening of one large plant in GHM, a
Veneto locality must experience an increase of 56 HWFs. This is the shock
in my simulation.
The predicted change in H that each non-HWF would experience after
5 years, the time horizon considered in GHM, is then dH ind;5 years = 56 
(b+ ab+ a2b+ a3b+ a4b+ a5b): This change in H can be obtained using the
estimates for a and b from Table 4.
In order to obtain the predicted change in productivity, I rst obtaincHind by estimating Equation (3) after replacing Hj with H indj : The results
using the di¤erent approaches (baseline OLS, OP, LP, polynomial functions
of capital and investments or capital and materials in t and t+ 1) are shown
in Table A.7. Using the baseline OLS productivity regression, estimated in
Column 1 of Table A.7, the predicted change in productivity attributable to
worker ows ve years the local output increase is equal to dTFP ind;5 years =dH ind;5 years  cHind;OLS = 0:022:
The nal step is to compare the magnitude of dTFP ind;5 yearswith GHMs
28This is due both to the fact that new entrants in GHM are signicantly larger than the
average new plant in the United States and the fact that the Veneto region is characterized
by the presence of small and medium-sized businesses, whose size is smaller than the typical
rm in United States. See Appendix VI for descriptive statistics.
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estimate of the overall productivity e¤ect caused by a local output increase.
The increase in productivity estimated by GHM ve years after the open-
ing for incumbent plants in the same two-digit industry equals 17 percent.
Hence, my back-of-the-envelope calculations suggest that worker ows ex-
plain 13.3 percent of the agglomeration advantages estimated by GHM. Re-
placing cHind;OLS with cHind;LP , the average e¤ect of recruiting a knowl-
edgeable worker with experience in the same industry estimated in the LP
specication (Column 3 of Table A.7), the contribution of worker ows to
the agglomeration advantages estimated by GHM is equal to 8.1 percent.
Overall, the results in this section of the paper suggest that worker ows
explain an economically relevant proportion of the productivity gains expe-
rienced by other rms when HWFs in the same industry are added to a local
labor market.
9 Conclusions
Identifying the microeconomic mechanisms underlying localized productivity
spillovers is crucial for understanding agglomeration economies. Without
knowing the precise nature of the interactions between rms and workers
that generate agglomeration advantages, it is di¢ cult to be condent about
the existence of any such advantages. Additionally, pinpointing the ultimate
causes of agglomeration advantages is helpful for understanding di¤erences in
productivity across industry clusters and localities. Finally, better knowledge
of the sources of the productivity advantages of agglomeration is important
for determining the optimal design of location-based policies.
This paper directly examined the role of labor mobility as a mechanism
for the transfer of e¢ ciency-enhancing knowledge and evaluated the extent
to which labor mobility can explain the productivity advantages of rms
located near other highly productive rms. In order to empirically assess the
importance of labor-market based knowledge spillovers, I used Social Security
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earnings records and detailed nancial information for rms from the Veneto
region of Italy.
While the issues analyzed in this paper are of general interest, the case
of Veneto is important because this region is part of a larger economic area
of Italy where, as in the Silicon Valley, networks of specialized small and
medium-sized rms, frequently organized in districts, have been e¤ective
in promoting and adapting to technological change during the last three
decades. This so called "Third Italy" region has received a good deal of
attention by researchers, in the United States as well as in Europe (Brusco,
1983; Piore and Sabel, 1984; Trigilia, 1990; Whitford, 2001; Piore, 2009).29
The empirical evidence presented using the unique dataset from Veneto
points to the concrete possibility that agglomeration of economic activity cre-
ates important productivity advantages at the local level. The productivity
benets of a non-HWF from being located in a cluster with a large number of
good rms rest with the opportunities to hire workers whose knowledge was
gained in good rms. Such knowledge can be successfully adapted internally.
More specically, the regression analysis showed that hiring a worker with
HWF experience increases the productivity of other (non-HWF) rms. A
simulation indicated that worker ows explain 10-15 percent of the produc-
tivity gains experienced by other rms when HWFs in the same industry are
added to a local labor market.
29Germanys Baden-Wurttermberg is also known "for its mix of small and medium-sized
makers of machine tools, textile equipment, and automobile components alongside giant
electronics corporations" (Saxenian, 1994, p. 7)
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Figure 1: Distribution of Firm E¤ects
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Figure 2: Distribution of HWFs across Local Labor Markets (LLMs)
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Table 1: Characteristics of HWFs, 1995-2001
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Y/L VA/L K/L Tangible Intangible
K/L K/L
HWF 0.150 0.113 0.104 0.066 0.270
(0.017) (0.012) (0.025) (0.027) (0.042)
Observations 26041 26041 26041 26041 26041
Adj. R-squared 0.160 0.106 0.181 0.187 0.0644
Dependent Variables are in logs. All OLS regressions include year and 4-digit
industry dummies. Output, Value Added and Capital variables are in 1000s
of 2000 euros. Standard errors (in parentheses) clustered by rm. The dummy
HWF takes value 1 if the rm is classied as high-wage after estimating the
AKM model on the period 1987-2000.
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Table 2: H Workers and Productivity in non-HWFs, Main Estimates, 1995-
2001
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
OLS OP LP Inv-Cap Inv-Mat Same/Di¤
Interact. Interact. Industry
log(capital) 0.097 0.093 0.149 0.000 0.000 0.097
(0.005) (0.020) (0.010) (0.000) (0.000) (0.005)
log(materials) 0.571 0.576 0.591 -3.878 0.571
(0.008) (0.009) (0.014) (0.510) (0.008)
log(employees) 0.235 0.235 0.204 0.212 0.181 0.235
(0.008) (0.009) (0.006) (0.014) (0.006) (0.008)
H workers 0.039 0.037 0.020 0.039 0.022
(0.008) (0.011) (0.006) (0.020) (0.009)
H from same Ind 0.072
(0.018)
H from di¤ Ind 0.024
(0.009)
sameH = 
diff
H ;pv 0.018
Observations 17937 6892 17937 3063 14120 17937
Adj. R-squared 0.924 0.930 0.948 0.924
Dependent variable: Log(Output). Standard errors (in parentheses) clustered by rm. H
workers is the number of workers with HWF experience currently observed at non-HWFs.
Column 1 reports estimates from the baseline specication. Column 2 implements the
procedure in Olley and Pakes (1996). Column 3 implements the procedure in Levinsohn
and Petrin (2003). Column 4 adds a third-degree polynomial function of log capital and log
investment and the interaction of both functions in t and t+1. Column 5 includes the same
controls as col. 5 but replaces log investment with log materials. Column 6 di¤erentiates
between workers moving within the same industry and between industries. sameH = 
diff
H ;pv
is the p-value of the equality of coe¢ cients of the variable H from same Indand the variable
H from di¤ Ind.
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Table 3: Knowledgeable Workers and Productivity in non-HWFs, IV Esti-
mates 1995-2001
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Baseline tradability localization 5 percent
H workers 0.268 0.269 0.278 0.231
(0.154) (0.154) (0.145) (0.164)
log(capital) 0.095 0.095 0.094 0.095
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006)
log(materials) 0.568 0.568 0.568 0.568
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
log(employees) 0.227 0.227 0.227 0.229
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
Observations 17937 17937 17937 17937
Adj. R-squared 0.908 0.908 0.907 0.910
Fstat, instrum., 1st stage 23.06 23.14 24.41 21.55
Dependent variable: Log(Output). Standard errors (in parentheses) clustered by LLM
(47). Regressions include industry-year interaction dummies and LLM-year interaction
dummies. Column 1 reports IV estimates using the lagged number of downsizing local
good rms in the same 5-digit industry. A good rm is considered as downsizing if the
drop in L is larger than 3 percent. The decrease in the labor force must also be greater
than or equal to three individuals. Column 2 adds an indicator of the importance of
local demand, namely a dummy taking value 1 if the 4-digit industry produces goods
that are not widely traded outside the LLM. Column 3 controls for an index of industry
localization, namely the ratio between the number of rms in Veneto and total Italian
rms in a given 4-digit industry. In Column 4 a good rm is considered as downsizing if
the drop in L is larger than 5 percent.
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Table 4: Number of local HWFs in same Industry and Knowledgeable Work-
ers moving within industry, GMM Estimates, 1989-2001
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Baseline Deviations Two-step Deviations/
Two-step
lag(H from same Ind) 0.231 0.355 0.150 0.208
(0.079) (0.122) (0.081) (0.115)
Local HWFs in same Ind 0.004 0.003 0.003 0.002
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Observations 29554 29933 29554 29933
AR(1)z -6.164 -5.053 -5.244 -4.063
AR(2)z 0.109 0.458 -0.405 -0.237
HansPv 0.272 0.366 0.272 0.366
Dependent variable: H from same Ind, the number of H workers moving within Industry.
Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses. Regressions include year dummies. Column
1 reports the baseline Di¤erence GMM results. Column 2 uses the forward orthogonal
deviations transform, proposed by Arellano and Bover (1995). Column 3 estimates the
model with two-step GMM and Windmeijer-corrected standard errors. Column 4 estimates
the model with two-step GMM, Windmeijer-corrected standard errors and orthogonal de-
viations. The variable Local HWFs in same industry is treated as endogenous. AR(1)z
and AR(2)z: Arelanno and Bond (1999) test of rst and second order serial correlation,
distributed as N(0,1). HansPv: p-value of Hansen test of overidentifying restrictions. For
all variables only the shortest allowable lagged is used as instrument.
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Appendix
I Data: Sample Restrictions and Descriptive Statistics
I use rm identiers to match job-year observations for workers aged 16-64
in the VWH with rm nancial data in AIDA for the period 1995-2001. The
match rate is fairly high: at least one observation in the VHW was found
for over 95 percent of the employers in the AIDA sample, and around 50
percent of employees observed in the VWH between 1995 and 2001 can be
matched to an AIDA rm. Most of the nonmatches seem to be workers of
small rms THAT are omitted from AIDA. In sum, I was able to match
at least one employee for around 18,000 rms, or around 10 percent of the
entire universe of employers contained in the VWH.30 From this set of po-
tential matches I execute two exclusions to obtain my estimation sample for
Equation (6). First, I remove all workers outside manufacturing. Next, I
exclude job-year observations with remarkably high or low values for wages
(I trim observations outside the 1 percent - 99 percent range).
The method in Abowd, Creecy and Kramarz (2002) identies separate
groups of workers and rms that are connected via labor mobility in the data.
I run the grouping algorithm separately using VHW data from 1987 to 2000
for rms that could be matched in AIDA and have more than 10 employees
in VHW. I then use the created group variable to choose the largest group as
the sample for my xed-e¤ects estimation. The largest group contains 99.1
percent of the woker-year observations (2,567,040 observations combining
457,763 individuals with 5,937 rms). I identify HWFs as those rms whose
rm e¤ects rank in the top third of the sample.31 Table A.2 illustrates that,
30Card, Devicienti and Maida (2011) show that the average rm size for the matched
jobs sample (36.0 workers) is considerably larger than that for total employers in the VWH
(7.0 workers). Mean daily wages for the matched observations are also greater, while the
fractions of under 30 and female employees are lower.
31In order to implement the approach in Abowd, Creecy and Kramarz (2002), I use the
a2reg Stata routine developed by Ouazad (2007).
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in contrast to rm characteristics, workforce characteristics of HWFs and non
HWFs are not so di¤erent: the shares of white collar workers and managers
are 1.8 and 0.3 percentage points higher, respectively, in HWFs; the share of
female workers is 3.1 percentage points lower. No di¤erence emerges in the
share of workers younger than 30 or older than 45. 32
The sample of non HWFs used in the main rm-level analysis equation
(3) - is summarized in Table A.1.33 The main analysis is performed over the
period for which balance sheet data are available (1995-2001). Notice the
overlap with the period over which Equation (6) is estimated (1987-2000).
In principle one would like to perform the two estimations - Equation (6) and
(3) - on two di¤erent samples. However, in practice the AKM routine requires
a large number of events of labor mobility in order for the rm and worker
e¤ects to be identied. Moreover, to precisely estimate cH one would like to
exploit as much variation as possible in H, i.e. as many moves from good
rms to other rms as possible. Choosing 2000 as the end period for the rst
estimation seems a good compromise because (a): it guarantees a long enough
panel for the AKM estimation, (b) it allows consideration of all the possible
moves from good rms to other rms (including in particular workers who
separate from good rms in 2000 and are observed in other rms in 2001) and
(c) still prevents a full overlapping between the two sample periods for the
two di¤erent estimations. I experimented with other choices for the period
of the AKM estimation, such as 1986-2000 or 1987-1999. Results are very
32Notice that since the specications in Table A.2 do not require information collected
from AIDA balance sheets, the sample period is not restricted to post-1995 observations.
33In order to obtain this estimation sample I rst remove HWF observations from the
sample of worker-rm matches. From this non-HWF sample I remove (a) rms that close
during the calendar year and (b) rm-year observations with remarkably high or low values
(outside the 1% - 99% range) for several key rm-level variables, such as total value of
production, number of employees, capital stock and value of materials. (c) rms in LLM
with centroids outside Veneto (3 LLMs). I then attempt to reduce the inuence of false
matches, particularly for larger rms, by implementing a strategy of Card, Devicienti and
Maida (2011) to eliminate the "gross outliers", a minor number of matches (less than 1%
of all employers) for which the absolute gap between the number of workers reported in a
rms AIDA balance sheet and the number found in the VWH is larger than 100.
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similar and available upon request.
II The Extent of Labor Mobility
For labor mobility to be a mechanism for transfer of knowledge, we must ob-
serve some workers moving from HWFs to other rms. On average, between
1995 and 2001, 4.3 percent of non HWFs in a given year employ workers with
HWF experience. Overall, 1187 workers switch from HWFs to non HWFs
during my sample period.34
It is important to observe that these numbers do not imply that in a
typical year 4.3 percent of Veneto rms are potentially a¤ected by knowledge
transfer. Recall that I only consider ows from rms in the top third of
estimated rm xed e¤ects to rms in the bottom third. As a result, these
numbers should be interpreted as implying that in a typical year about 4.3
percent of the rms in the bottom third of the distribution employ at least
one worker with experience at a rm in the top third. There obviously exists
signicant labor mobility within the two groups that may also serve as a
channel of knowledge transfer. To illustrate, one can intuitively imagine that
a worker moving from a rm in the 1st percentile of the distribution to a
rm in the 19th percentile may bring e¢ ciency-enhancing knowledge to his
or her new job35, and the same can be imagined for a worker moving from a
rm in the 21st percentile to a rm in the 99th percentile. However I focus
solely on ows between the two groups.
It is also important to note that the percentage of rms that employ
34787 are blue collar workers, 331 are white collar workers, 46 are managers and 23 are
apprentices.
35Despite potential lawsuits due to violations of non-compete covenants and trade secret
law, one frequently observes top rms poaching employees from competitors in an e¤ort
to acquire some of their internal knowledge. This poaching is sometimes so intense that
companies may cut deals to refrain from competing for employees. In December 2010, the
U.S. Justice Department settled an antitrust suit with Lucaslm over a no solicitation
agreement with rival Pixar. In September of the same year, the Justice Department had
settled another suit over similar agreements involving Adobe Systems, Apple, Google,
Intel, Intuit and Pixar (The New York Times, January 2, 2011).
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workers with HWF experience varies with the threshold that I impose on the
distribution. For instance, if I dene HWFs as rms with xed e¤ects in the
top half of the overall distribution, 8.4 percent of non HWFs employ workers
with HWF experience, compared with 4.3 percent if HWFs are dened by
falling in the top third of the xed-e¤ects distribution.
In the main text I show estimates of the extent to which non HWFs
benet from hiring workers from HWFs by entering an annual rm-level
measure (H) of the number of workers with experience at HWFs into a
production function. Since only a small subest of non HWFs in a given year
employ workers with HWF experience, the mean value of H workers across
the sample of non HWFs is small (0.071). The maximum value is 7. Notice
that the mean number of employees at non HWFs is 48, and the median is
33.
As regards to individual characteristics of the movers in my sample, in all
years movers from HWFs are signicantly more likely to be young and male
than non HWFs workers without experience at good rms. In most years,
these movers are also signicantly more likely to be white-collar workers and
managers. Table A.3 and A.4 give descriptive statistics in the most recent
year (2001) for movers from good rms to non HWFs and non HWFs workers
without experience at good rms.
III The Role of Geographical Proximity
There exist at least two reasons why geographic proximity might be im-
portant for observed worker ows. First, distance may act as a barrier for
workersjob mobility because of commuting costs or idiosyncratic preferences
for location. Descriptive statistics in Combes and Duranton (2006) show that
labor ows in France are mostly local: about 75% of skilled workers remain
in the same employment area when they switch rms. The degree of geo-
graphical mobility implied by this gure is small, since the average French
employment area is comparable to a circle of radius 23 kilometers. In Dal
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Bo, Finan and Rossi (2013), randomized job o¤ers produce causal estimates
of the e¤ect of commuting distance on job acceptance rates. Distance appears
to be a very strong (and negative) determinant of job acceptance: applicants
are 33% less likely to accept a job o¤er if the municipality to which they are
assigned is more than 80 kilometers away from their home municipality. The
estimates in Manning and Petrongolo (2013) also suggest a relatively fast
decay of job utility with distance. Another reason geographical proximity
may be an important determinant of job mobility is that the rms infor-
mational cost of identifying the right" employee are larger across localities
than within them. A similar argument can be made for the informational
costs for workers.
IV Sensitivity analysis
The main empirical result in the rst part of the paper is that labor mobility
from HWFs to other rms in the region works as a mechanism for the transfer
of e¢ ciency-enhancing knowledge. Table A.6 shows results from a series of
specication checks. As a basis for comparison, Column 1 shows the estimates
from the baseline specication in Column 1 of Table 2. Considering the
di¤erences in observable characteristics documented in Appendix II between
movers from HWFs and other workers at non HWFs, in Column 2 I augment
Equation (3) with the share of females, managers, blue-collar and white-
collar workers, and di¤erently aged workers at each rm. The results largely
remained unchanged.
Column 3 shows estimates using the within-transformation. These esti-
mates should be interpreted cautiously because the within estimator is known
from practical experience to perform poorly in the context of production
functions (Eberhardt and Helmer, 2010). Indeed, estimates in Column 3 in-
dicate severely decreasing returns to scale, likely due to measurement error
in the input variables, whose inuence is exacerbated by the variable trans-
formation. The problem of using the within-transformation is the removal of
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considerable information from the data, since only variation over time is left
to identify parameters. Setting this concern aside, the results show a positive
and signicant coe¢ cient on H (0.012) that is smaller than the baseline OLS
coe¢ cient, and the coe¢ cients in other specications reported in Table 2.
Columns 4-5 investigate the role of functional form assumption. Until
now, I have presented results based on specications where the intensity of
potential knowledge transferred is measured by the number of H workers.
In Column 4, I model this intensity as the share of workers with recent
experience at good rms, dividing H by L. The coe¢ cient is positive and
signicant: a one percentage point increase in h is associated with a change
in productivity of 0.8percent.36 In Column 5 I estimate:
ln(Yjslt) = 0 + L ln(jsltLjslt) + K ln(Kjslt) + M ln(Mjslt) + Hl log(Hjslt) +
+1(H = 0)jslt + st +$lt + vjslt
Compared to Equation (3) I replaced Hjslt with its logarithm, and I imposed
log(Hjslt) = 0 for the observations with Hjslt = 0. Plus, I added the dummy
1(H = 0)jslt taking value 1 if the number of knowledgeable workers is equal
to 0. The results using this alternative functional form are again consistent
with those discussed in the main text.
Finally, I address the issue of unobservables related with new hires. If
workers who recently changed rms are more productive than stayers, the ef-
fect of newly hired workers with HWF experience may equally apply to newly
hired employees without HWF experience. In order to explore this possibil-
ity I rst dene medium-wage-rms (MWFs) as those whose estimated rm
36Since there may be measurement error in L; the number of employees in the
AIDA data, a potential problem with such specication arises. Rewrite equation (3)
as ln ( Yjst
Ljst
) = K ln (Kjst) + M ln (M jst) + hhjst+st+$lt+vjslt: Since h = H=L, a
mechanical relantionship between h and the dependent variable may arise at time t. To
address this issue, I also use the lagged share of H workers obtained from head counts in
the Social Security dataset. The coe¢ cient estimate (not shown) is 0.650 (0.345).
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xed e¤ects from the AKM model fall between the 33th percentile and the
67th percentile of all estimated rm e¤ects, and low-wage-rms (LWFs) as
those whose estimated rm xed e¤ects fall below the bottom third. I then
construct two new variables. The rst one, denoted with eH is the number
of workers with recent experience at HWFs currently observed at MWF m.
I dene a worker as having recent HWF-experience in year t; if he or she is
observed working in a HWF for one or more of the years t  5 to t  1. If a
worker is hired at time t   g, and has experience at a HWF between t   g
and t  5, she contributes to eH count from year t  g until t. 37 The second
variable I construct, denoted with eN , is the number of workers with recent
experience at LWFs currently observed at MWF m. I then estimate for the
sample of MWFs:
ln(Ymslt) = 0 + L ln(msltLmslt) + K ln(Kmslt) + M ln(Mmslt) +
+ eH eHmslt +  eN eNmslt + st +$lt + vmslt
In this specication, the identication of knowledge transfer relies on
the di¤erential e¤ect of hiring an employee with recent HWF experience
over hiring an employee from a LWF. By including both eH and eN , any
potential bias caused by the correlation between unobservables and new hires
is removed. Column 6 shows the results. The coe¢ cient of eH is positive
(.041) and signicant. The coe¢ cient of eN is positive but smaller (0.015)
and not signicant. The di¤erence in productivity e¤ects associated with
each type of "movers" is signicant at 10 percent level. The productivity
e¤ect attributed to knowledgeable workers, therefore, does not appear to be
associated with recently hired workers in general. That large productivity
gains linked to hiring seem to be realized only when new hires come from
more productive rms is consistent with the knowledge spillovers hypothesis.
37It may be instructive to consider a practical example. Consider a worker who separates
from a HWF in 1992 and joins MWF m in 1995. Provided that the worker remains in j,
she will be counted as a knowledgeable worker for every year from 1995 to 1997.
45
V Non-Tradable Goods
In Column 2 I added a dummy taking value one if the industry produces
goods that are not widely traded outside the LLM. Industries for which
the dummy takes value one are those classied as SMSA industries by Weiss
(1974): Bottled and Canned Soft Drinks and Carbonated, Mineral, and Plain
Waters; Fluid Milk; Bread and Other Bakery Products, Except Cookies and
Crackers; Manufactured Ice; Primary Forest Products; Newspapers; Com-
mercial Printing (except Lithographic); Commercial Printing (Lithographic);
Engraving and Plate Printing; Typesetting; Photo-Engraving; Electrotyping
and Stereotyping; Ready-Mix Concrete.
VI Simulation details
Table 1 in GHM reports statistics for the sample of plants whose opening is
considered in their study. These plants are quite large: they are more than
twice the size of the average incumbent plant and account for roughly nine
percent of the average countys total output one year prior to their opening.
The mean output (ve years after their assigned opening date) is 452,801,
000 of year-2006 dollars, or 395,476,000 of 2000 euros. Standard deviation
is 901,690, 000 of year-2006 dollars. As explained in the notes of Table 1 in
GHM, these statistics are for a subset of the 47 plant openings studied by
the authors. In particular, a few very large outlier plants were dropped so
that the mean would be more representative of the entire distribution (those
dropped had output greater than half of their countys previous output and
sometimes much more).
In order to establish the increase in the number of HWFs that a Veneto
locality must experience to observe a change in local output comparable
to the output increase caused by the opening of one large plant in GHM,
I need to obtain the value of output for a typical HWF. Instead of drop-
ping very large outlier plans as in GHM, I take the median of the distrib-
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ution. The median value of output for HWFs in my sample is 7,028,000 of
year-2000 euros. Therefore a Veneto locality must experience an increase of
395,476,000/7,028,000=56 HWFs. This is the shock in my simulation.
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VIII Additional Tables and Figures
Table A.1: non-HWFs, Main Estimation Sample
Variable Mean (Std. Dev.) Min. Max. N
Output 8205.547 (9085.215) 1086.012 83537.188 17937
Capital 1829.342 (2400.112) 57.222 20876.002 17937
materials 4148.033 (5403.845) 68.405 47337.867 17937
value added 2088.875 (2293.955) -4082.134 34466.188 17937
Tangible Capital 1691.601 (2265.701) 2.833 20668 17937
Intangible Capital 137.741 (382.714) 0 11837.857 17937
employees from AIDA 48.069 (47.239) 2 420 17937
employees from VWH 49.173 (45.404) 11 458 17937
apprentices 1.033 (2.004) 0 47 17937
blue collars 30.178 (30.144) 0 348 17937
white collars 9.638 (11.927) 0 251 17937
managers 0.662 (1.855) 0 54 17937
female employees 13.157 (18.874) 0 309 17937
employees age< 30 13.988 (13.499) 0 201 17937
employees age> 45 9.128 (12.893) 0 199 17937
H workers 0.071 (0.302) 0 7 17937
H workers same Ind 0.021 (0.161) 0 5 17937
H workers di¤ Ind 0.051 (0.245) 0 7 17937
H managers 0.003 (0.053) 0 2 17937
H white collars 0.024 (0.164) 0 3 17937
H blue collars 0.044 (0.231) 0 6 17937
Sample includes 3661 Individual Firms in the period 1995-2001. Output, Capital, Materials, Value
Added are in thousands of 2000 euros. Employees from AIDA refers to the values found in the
AIDA balance sheet data. Employees from VWH refers to the values obtained from head count in
the Veneto Worker History data from Social Security.
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Table A.2: Characteristics of HWFs Workforce, 1987-2001
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
share share share share share
white coll. manager female age<30 age>45
HWF 0.018 0.003 -0.031 0.000 -0.006
(0.004) (0.001) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004)
Observations 58102 58102 58102 58102 58102
Adj. R-squared 0.226 0.103 0.569 0.167 0.140
All OLS regressions include year and 4-digit industry dummies. Standard errors
(in parentheses) clustered by rm. The dummy HWF takes value 1 if the rm
is classied as high-wage after estimating the AKM model on the period 1987-
2000.
Table A.3: Characteristics of Knowledgeable Workers observed at non-
HWFs, 2001
Variable Mean (Std. Dev.) Min. Max. N
age 33.813 (8.481) 18 62 407
female 0.251 (0.434) 0 1 407
blue collar 0.548 (0.498) 0 1 407
white collar 0.388 (0.488) 0 1 407
manager 0.049 (0.216) 0 1 407
Table A.4: Characteristics of Workers without HWF experience observed at
non-HWFs, 2001
Variable Mean (Std. Dev.) Min. Max. N
age 37.08 (9.538) 16 65 192588
female 0.32 (0.467) 0 1 192588
blue collar 0.71 (0.454) 0 1 192352
white collar 0.242 (0.428) 0 1 192352
manager 0.023 (0.15) 0 1 192352
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Table A.5: Instrumental Variables, 1995-2001
Variable Mean (Std. Dev.) Min. Max. N
lag (downsizing HWFs, > 3 percent) 0.33 (0.973) 0 7 17937
lag (downsizing HWFs, > 5 percent) 0.307 (0.909) 0 7 17937
The variable lag (downsizing HWFs, > 3 percent)  is the lagged number of downsizing
local good rms in a given 5-digit industry. A good rm is considered as downsizing if the
drop in L is larger than 3 percent. The decrease in the labor force must also be greater than
or equal to three individuals. In constructing the variable downsizing HWFs, > 5 percent
a good rm is considered as downsizing if the drop in L is larger than 5 percent.
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Table A.6: Knowledgeable Workers and Productivity in non-HWFs, Robust-
ness to Di¤erent Specications
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Baseline Workforce Within Share Log Recent
OLS Characteristics Experience
log(capital) 0.097 0.093 0.066 0.097 0.097 0.095
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.007)
log(materials) 0.571 0.561 0.586 0.571 0.571 0.565
(0.008) (0.008) (0.015) (0.008) (0.008) (0.012)
log(employees) 0.235 0.243 0.064 0.238 0.235 0.251
(0.008) (0.008) (0.005) (0.008) (0.008) (0.012)
H workers 0.039 0.034 0.012
(0.008) (0.008) (0.005)
share H workers 0.765
(0.171)
log(H workers) 0.066
(0.030)
No H workers -0.040
(0.011)
Recent HWF exp 0.041
(0.010)
Recent LWF exp 0.015
(0.011)
HWFeH = LWFeN ;pv 0.092
Observations 17937 17937 17937 17937 17937 9269
Adj. R-squared 0.924 0.925 0.985 0.924 0.924 0.932
Dependent variable: Log(Output). Standard errors (in parentheses) clustered by rm. Regressions
include industry-year interaction dummies and LLM-year interaction dummies. The variable H work-
ers is the number of knowledgeable workers currently observed at non-HWFs. The variable log(H
workers) is the logarithm of number of knowledgeable workers. The dummy No H workerstakes
value 1 if the number of knowledgeable workers is equal to 0. The variable Recent HWF expis the
number of workers currently observed at Column 1 reports estimates from the baseline specication.
Column 2 adds the shares of managers, white collars, blue collars, females, and di¤erently aged work-
ers. Column 3 reports within estimates. Column 4 replaces the number of H workers with the share
of H workers. Column 5 replaces the number of H workers with the log of H workers plus the dummy
No H workers. Column 6 is estimated on the sample of MWFs and includes workers with recent
experience at HWF and Low-Wage-Firms (LWFs). HWFeH = LWFeN ;pv is the p-value of the equality
of coe¢ cients of the variable Recent HWF expand the variable Recent LWF exp
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Table A.7: Knowledgeable Workers with experience in the same industry and
Productivity in non-HWFs, 1995-2001
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Baseline OP LP Inv-Cap Inv-Mat
OLS Interactions Interactions
log(capital) 0.098 0.094 0.149 ... ...
(0.005) (0.021) (0.010)
log(materials) 0.571 0.576 0.592 ...
(0.008) (0.009) (0.014)
log(employees) 0.235 0.235 0.204 0.213 0.181
(0.008) (0.009) (0.006) (0.014) (0.006)
H workers same Ind 0.073 0.078 0.044 0.094 0.058
(0.018) (0.025) (0.015) (0.045) (0.016)
Observations 17937 6892 17937 3063 14120
Adj. R-squared 0.924 0.930 0.948
Dependent variable: Log(Output). Standard errors (in parentheses) clustered by rm. The variable
H workers same Indis the number of workers with HWF experience in the same industry currently
observed at non-HWFs. Column 1 reports estimates from the baseline specication. Column 2
implements the procedure in Olley and Pakes (1996). Column 3 implements the procedure in
Levinsohn and Petrin (2003). Column 4 adds a third-degree polynomial function of log capital and
log investment and the interaction of both functions in t and t+1. Column 5 includes the same
controls as col. 5 but replaces log investment with log materials.
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